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STREVELL PATERSON, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. FRANCIS 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 1 7598 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent, Strevell Paterson (hereinafter 
"plaintiff"), brought suit against defendant-appellant, Michael R. 
Francis (hereinafter "defendant"), based on defendant's personal 
guaranty of the debts of Mountain Lands Sports, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Mountain Lands"). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On December 9, 1980, plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was heard in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. On December 
29, 1980, the Court entered an Order granting plaintiff's motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the Order of the District 
Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant's Statement of Facts contains certain in-
accurate and irrelevant information, and, therefore, plaintiff 
restates the facts as follows: 
On January 19, 1977, defendant executed a written 
guaranty agreement (hereinafter the "Guaranty") whereby he agreed 
to personally guaranty payment of the purchase price of all goods 
and merchandise sold to Mountain Lands by plaintiff. (R. 6). In 
answer to plaintiff's Request for Admissions, defendant admitted 
the execution of the Guaranty and the authenticity of the copy 
thereof exhibited to the Complaint. (R. 28). 
On April 1, 1978, defendant entered into an agreement 
with David J. Toussaint by which defendant purported to sell all 
the assets of Mountain Lands to Toussaint. (R. 36-42). The 
agreement was stated to be effective as of the date of its execu-
tion on April 1, 1978. (R. 36). 
On April 5, 1978, defendant, purporting to act in a 
representative capacity for Mountain Lands, executed and deliv-
ered to plaintiff a promissory note (hereinafter the "Note") in 
the principal amount of $14,990.95. (R. 5). In answer to 
plaintiff's Request for Admissions, defendant admitted the 
execution of the Note and the authenticity of the copy thereof 
exhibited to the Complaint. (R. 27-28). Defendant further ad-
mitted that the Note was given to evidence a debt from Mountain 
Lands to plaintiff for past open account purchases of goods and 
merchandise. (R. 28). 
On April 14, 1978, defendant, purporting to act in a 
- 2 - i 
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representative capacity for Mountain Lands, entered into a 
security agreement (hereinafter the "Security Agre em en t") 
granting plaintiff a security interest in all the inventory, 
equipment, and other personal property owned by Mountain Lands to 
secure the Note of April 5, 1978. (R. 35). 
On June 5, 1979, plaintiff obtained a judgment against 
Mountain Lands on the Note in the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County for $16,511.41, with interest thereon at the rate of 
12% per annum. (R. 7-8). 
Despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant re-
fused to pay the amount owing from Mountain Lands to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff then brought this action seeking to enforce defendant's 
compliance with the Guaranty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORAL RELEASE AGREEMENT ALLEGED BY 
DEFENDANT WOULD BE UNENFORCEABLE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Defendant argues that the District Court erred in 
granting plaintiff summary judgment based on the Guaranty be-
cause the parties allegedly entered into an oral agreement 
which released defendant as a guarantor. The oral release 
alleged by defendant would be unenforceable as a matter of 
law under the statute of frauds, and, therefore, does not 
create a material issue of fact which would preclude summary 
judgment in this action. 
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Ann. (2d repl. vol. 1976) 
- 3 -
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provides, in relevant part: 
In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged there-
with: 
* * * 
(2) Every promise to answer for the 
debt, default or miscarriage of another. 
* * * 
The Guaranty executed by the defendant was a promise 
to answer for the debt of Mountain Lands. As such, the Guaranty 
was within the statute of frauds, and was required to be in writ-
ing and subscribed by the defendant. The requirements of the 
statute of frauds were fully satisfied by the written Guaranty, 
which bears the defendant's signature. 
It is well established under Utah law that any agree-
ment which purports to alter or amend an agreement within the 
statute of frauds must also be in writing and subscribed. In 
Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 267 P. 1020, 1035 (Utah 1928), 
the Court held: 
[T]he original contract to be binding and 
enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of 
frauds, was required to be, as it was, in 
writing and subscribed by the parties 
sought to be charged. To alter or modify 
any of its material parts or terms by a 
subsequent agreement required one also 
to be in writing and so subscribed ••• 
This principle was unequivocally reaffirmed in Zions' Propertie~ 
Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 319, 322 (Utah 1975), in which the Court 
said: 
- 4 -
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It is elementary that when a contract is 
required to be in writing, the same re-
quirement applies with equal force to 
any alteration or modification thereof. 
The oral release agreement alleged by defendant pur-
ports to alter the obligation created by the Guaranty. Such an 
alteration is within the statue of frauds, and is void and un-
enforceable unless it is in writing and properly subscribed. 
Because the alleged oral release agreement does not comply with 
the requirements of the statute of frauds, it cannot constitute a 
valid defense to plaintiff's suit on the Guaranty. 
In his Brief on Appeal, defendant argues that the 
alleged oral release agreement is excluded from the statute of 
frauds by section 25-5-6(3), Utah Code Ann. (2d repl. vol. 1976). 
In so arguing, defendant completely misconstrues the language of 
that section. The portion of the statute relied upon by defen-
dant provides as follows: 
A promise to answer for the obligation 
of another in any of the following cases is 
deemed an original obligation of the promissor 
and need not be in writing: 
* * * 
(3) Where the promise, being for an 
antecedent obligation of another, is made 
upon the consideration that the party re-
ceiving it cancel the antecedent obligation, 
accepting the new promise as a substitute 
therefore ••• • 
* * * 
The quoted language deals with a situation in which a 
person agrees to assume the debt of another and thereby becomes 
soley liable to the obligee of the debt. Section 25-5-6(3) would 
- 5 -
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only be applicable in the instant case if the defendant had 
agreed to become solely liable for the existing debt of Mountain 
Lands, and, in consideration therefore, plaintiff had cancelled 
Mountain Lands' obligation. Neither of those things occurred in 
this case. Defendant does not claim to have become solely liable 
for the obligation, and it has never been suggested by either 
party that the alleged release acted to cancel the existing ob-
ligation of Mountain Lands. Consequently, section 25-5-6(3) can-
not be construed to apply to the Guaranty or the alleged release 
agreement in this case. 
The remainder of defendant's argument at Point II.A. 
of his Brief deals with the parole evidence rule. Discussion of 
the parole evidence rule is inapposite as plaintiff did not as-
sert the parole evidence rule as a basis for its Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, and it was not discussed or considered by the 
District Court in its ruling. 
POINT II 
THE ORAL RELEASE AGREEMENT ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT 
WOULD BE UNENFORCEABLE FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
A. The Alleged Release Agreement Must Be Supported by Consid-
eration to Be Valid. 
A release agreement, like any contract, must be sup-
ported by consideration to be valid. See Holbrook v. Webster'_!,_ 
Inc., 7 Utah 2d 148, 320 P.2d 661, 663 (1958). Accordingly, it is 
universally recognized that "where there is no consideration 
to support the creditor's promise to release the guarantor from 
- 6 -
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his contractual liability under the guaranty, the promise is not 
binding and is not a defense to an action by the creditor on the 
guaranty." 38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty §80 (1968); 38 C.J.S. Guaranty 
§68 (1943); Anno. 126 A.L.R. 1241 (1940). 
Contrary to the universal authority, defendant argues 
at Point 11.B. of his Brief that no consideration was required 
for the alleged release agreement. In support of this argument, 
defendant cites section 70A-3-408, Utah Code Ann. (repl. vol. 
1980). This section falls under the Commercial Paper chapter 
of the Utah Uniform Commerical Code. Specifically, section 
70A-3-408 deals with negotiable instruments and obligations. 
Obviously, a release agreement cannot be characterized as either 
a negotiable instrument or an obligation within the meaning of 
the Commercial Paper chapter of U.C.C. Moreover, it is readily 
apparent that plaintiff did not agree to give the alleged release 
"in payment of or as security for an antecedent obligation" owed 
to the defendant, as section 70A-3-408 contemplates. Defendant's 
reliance upon section 70A-3-408 to support his argument that no 
consideration was required for the alleged release agreement is 
completely misplaced. 
Defendant's reliance on A.M. Castle & Co. v. Bagley, 
467 P.2d 408 (Utah 1970) is similarly misplaced. That case was 
decided under section 70A-3-408 and might be cited for the propo-
sition that no consideration was necessary to support the Note 
given by Mountain Lands to plaintiff, but it has no applicability 
to the issue of whether consideration was required to support the 
alleged release agreement. 
- 7 -
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Finally, defendant cites section 70A-2-201 (1), ~ 
Code Ann. (repl. vol. 1980) to support his argument that no con-
sideration was necessary for the alleged release agreement. De-
fendant apparently intended to cite section 70A-2-209(1) which 
provides: "An agreement modifying a contract within this chapter 
needs no consideration to be binding." By its own terms, this 
section applies only to contracts within the Sales chapter of 
the U.C.C. The Guaranty in the instant case was not a contract 
for the sale of goods, and, therefore, section 70A-2-209 would 
have no applicability to an agreement purporting to release the 
Guaranty. 
B. The Alleged Release Agreement Did Not Constitute an Accord 
and Satisfaction and Was Not Supported by Consideration. 
Defendant argues at Point II. C. of his Brief that the 
alleged release was given in exchange for the Note and Security 
Agreement of Mountain Lands and that this arrangement constituted 
an accord and satisfaction. This argument is without merit be-
cause no consideration was given for the alleged accord. 
To be valid an accord and satisfaction must be sup-
ported by consideration. As the Court stated in the recent 
case of Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 
(Utah 1980): 
Accord and satisfaction arrises where 
the parties to an agreement resolve that a 
given performance by one party thereto, 
offered in substitution of the performance 
originally agreed upon, will discha:g: 
the obligation created under the original 
agreement. Essential to its validity 
are, (1) a proper subject matter; (2) :om-
petent parties; (3) and assent or meeting 
- 8 -
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of the minds of the parties; and (4) a 
consideration given for the accord. Where 
the underlying claim is disputed or uncertain 
("unliquidated"), the obligor' s assent 
to the definite statement of performance 
in the accord amounts to sufficient con-
sideration, as it constitutes a surrender 
o~ the right to dispute the initial obliga-
tion. Where, however, the underlying claim 
is liquidated and certain as to amount, 
separate consideration must be found to 
support the accord; otherwise the obligor 
binds himself to do nothing that he was not 
already obligated to do and the obligee's 
promise to accept a substitute performance is 
unenforceable. 
Defendant argues that the Note of Mountain Lands was 
given in compromise of the claims of the parties, and, therefore, 
constituted sufficient consideration for the accord. This argu-
ment has no foundation in the record. Defendant did not submit 
to the District Court any affidavit or other sworn statement 
avering that plaintiff's claim against Mountain Lands was dis-
puted or unliquidated. The only evidence before the District 
Court indicated that the Note was given to evidence a liquidated 
obligation. In paragraph 6 of his answer to plaintiff's Request 
for Admissions, defendant admitted: 
Defendant admits that the promissory 
note referred to [in] Request for Admission 
No. 2 was given to evidence past sales of 
goods on open account and other amounts 
owed to Strevell Paterson by Mountain 
Lands Sports, Inc •• 
Defendant's statement that the Note was given to "evidence" an 
"open account and other amounts owed" clearly indicates that 
plaintiff's claim against Mountain Lands was liquidated in 
character. 
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense, 
- 9 -
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and the burden is upon the defendant to prove its essential 
elements. Defendant failed to file with the District Court any 
affidavit or other sworn statement avering that the Note was 
given to compromise an unliquidated claim. Where the only evi-
dence in the record as to the character of the claim for which 
the Note was given is defendant's admission that the Note was 
given to "evidence" an "open account and other amounts owed," 
the District Court did not err in holding as a matter of law that 
the alleged accord was not given in consideration for the corn-
promise of an unliquidated claim. 
Regardless of whether plaintiff's claim against Moun-
tain Lands was liquidated or unliquidated, defendant's theory of 
accord and satisfaction suffers from other fatal defects. First, 
defendant persistently argues that the release agreement allegedly 1 
made by him in his individual capacity was supported by considera· 
tion flowing between plaintiff and Mountain Lands. Defendant has 
never claimed that he personally gave any consideration for the 
alleged release agreement. Instead, he claims that the corpora-
tion's act of giving the note and security agreement supplied 
consideration for his personal release. This attempt to merge 
his personal identity with that of Mountain Lands is inconsistent 
with defendant's position that he is not personally obligated for 
the corporation's debts. 
An even more fundamental defect exists in defendant's 
argument that the act of Mountain Lands in giving the Note and 
Security Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction or was 
separate consideration for the alleged release agreement. This 
- 10 -
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defect appears on the face of the record on appeal to this Court. 
Defendant concedes in his Statement of the Facts at pages 2-3 of 
his Brief that, "on or about the first day of April, 1978, Defen-
dant MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, sold all interest he owned in the Cor-
poration to DAVID J. TOUSSANT." The agreement upon which defen-
dant bases his statement that he divested himself of all interest 
in the corporation was executed on April 1, 1978 and was stated 
to be effective as of the date of its execution. (R. 36-42). 
Significantly, the Note and Security Agreement signed by defen-
dant, purporting to act in a representative capacity for Mountain 
Lands, were not executed until April 5, 1978 and April 14, 1978 
respectively. Because defendant admits that he sold all his 
interest in Mountain Lands as of April 1, 1978, it must also be 
taken as admitted that he was without right, title or authority 
to subsequently execute a promissory note on behalf of the cor-
poration or pledge the corporation's property as security for the 
Note. Obviously, the Note and Security Agreement executed by the 
defendant after the date on which he admits he sold all his in-
terest in the corporation were of no value whatsoever and could 
not constitute valid consideration for the alleged oral release 
agreement. 
In summary, whether defendant argues that the consid-
eration for the alleged release was the compromise of the claim 
underlying the Note or the giving of the Security Agreement, the 
result is the same. Having concedely sold all his interest in 
Mountain Lands as of April 1, 1978, defendant could not and did 
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not give anything by his subsequent execution of the corporate 
Note on April 5, 1978 or the Security Agreement covering cor-
porate inventory on April 14, 1978. 
POINT Ill 
DEFENDANT'S GUARANTY OF PAYMENT WAS ABSOLUTE, 
AND, THEREFORE, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
PURSUE ITS CLAIM AGAINST THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR. 
Defendant argues in Point Ill of his Brief that pla~· 
tiff's suit on the Guaranty is barred because plaintiff has not 
demonstrated what steps have been taken to pursue its claim against 
Mountain Lands. This argument is without merit because defendant's 
guarantee was absolute, and, therefore, plaintiff was not re-
quired to take any steps to pursue its claim against Mountain 
Lands before suing on the Guaranty. It is universally held, and 
has been expressly so stated by this Court, that a guaranty of 
"payment," as opposed to a guaranty of "collection," is absolute 
in nature. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Hydro Swift Corp., 528 
P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1974); 38 Am.Jur.2d, Guaranty §110 (1968); 
see also, section 70A-3-416, Utah Code Ann. (repl. vol. 1980). 
"[Where] the guaranty is absolute, the creditor need not pursue 
any claim which he might have against the debtor's property before 
proceeding against the guarantor." 38 Am.Jur.2d, Guaranty §110 
(1958). 
As the Court observed in Westinghouse, supra: 
Whether a creditor • • • has a duty to pursue 
the debtor ••• as a predicate to action 
against a guarantor ••• depends on the 
nature of the guarantor's promise. 
The Guaranty executed by the defendant provides: 
- 12 -
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[W]e hereby guarantee and hold ourselves personally 
responsible for the payment at maturity of 
the purchase.price of all such goods, wares, 
and merchandise so sold and delivered whether 
evidenced by open account or note. (Emphasis 
added). (R. 6). 
By guarantying "payment" of the indebtedness of Moun-
tain Lands rather than the collection thereof, defendant became 
obligated to honor the Guaranty without regard to any action 
taken by the plaintiff in pursuit of its claim against the prin-
cipal debtor. Having given his absolute guaranty, defendant may 
not now argue that plaintiff has not properly pursued collection 
efforts against Mountain Lands. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly held that no valid release 
agreement existed between the parties, and that defendant was 
liable to plaintiff on his personal guaranty. The oral release 
agreement alleged by defendant would be invalid and unenforceable 
as a matter of law either because it did not comply with the re-
quirements of the statute of frauds or because it was not supported 
by valid consideration. Defendant's guaranty of payment was 
absolute in nature, and, therefore, plaintiff was not required to 
pursue collection efforts against the principal debtor before 
instituting suit on the Guaranty. 
The Order of the District Court should be affirmed. 
- 13 -
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